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Abstract
Decision makers lack a clear, generalizable method to quantify how additional
investment in inventory and capacity equates to additional levels of resilience. This
research facilitates a deeper understanding of the intricacies and complex
interconnectedness of organizational supply chains by monetarily quantifying changes in
network resilience. The developed Area under the Curve metric (AUC) is used to
quantify the level of demand that each asset allocation can meet during a disruptive
event. Due to its applicability across multiple domains, the USAF F-16 repair network in
the Pacific theater (PACAF) is modeled utilizing discrete event simulation and used as
the illustrating example. This research uses various levels of production capacity and
response time as the primary resilience levers. However, it is essential to simultaneously
invest in inventory and capacity to realize the greatest impacts on resilience. Real-world
demand and cost data are incorporated to identify the inherent cost-resilience
relationships, essential for evaluating the response and recovery capabilities across the
developed scenarios. Results indicate that recovery capacity and response time are the
greatest drivers of recovery after a disruption. Additionally, numerous network designs
employing various levels of design flexibility are evaluated and recommended for future
capacity expansion.
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RESILIENT AIRCRAFT SUSTAINMENT:
QUANTIFYING RESILIENCE THROUGH ASSET
AND CAPACITY ALLOCATION
I. Introduction
As the world continues to globalize, complexity amongst organizational supply
chains continues to grow (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Pettit et al., 2010). Supply chains
have lengthened, and the need to rely upon strategic partners has risen, creating an
advanced interconnectedness among critical nodes (Christopher & Peck, 2004). This
leads to a drastic increase in the operational vulnerabilities and uncertainties that firms
continuously face (Tang, 2006). Ultimately, this creates the need to investigate ways to
become more efficient and competitive in an environment that is constantly changing. To
sustain a competitive advantage, decision makers often attempt to achieve “fully
integrated and efficient” supply chain operations usually at the cost of risk mitigation
capabilities elsewhere (Christopher & Peck, 2004:1). This foundational tradeoff between
efficiency and risk mitigation exists in many respects of the supply chain and further adds
to the narrative of an uncertain future (Pettit et al., 2010; de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011).
Therefore, an organization’s ability to mitigate the impact of network disruptions on
network performance is critical to the short-term ability to meet demand, but more
importantly, to an organization’s long-term survival.
This research facilitates a deeper understanding of the complex interconnectedness of
organizational supply chains by using the example of the F-16 repair network located in
the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) theater. This research helps to further develop a
generalizable tool and methodology to quantify network resilience. It analyzes
incremental changes in resilience from the simultaneous investment in resilience levers.
1

Additionally, foundational cost-resilience relationships are identified, providing essential
insight into the response and recovery capabilities of various network designs. PACAF
was strategically chosen because of its immense geographic area, as well as the continual
rise in operational and strategic capabilities of US adversarial threats located in theater.
This research posits the use of the Area under the Curve (AUC) metric, which identifies
the number of mission-capable days the network can support over time (Femano et al.,
2019). The AUC provides decision makers the ability to forecast network performance
levels resulting from predetermined asset allocations and corresponding investment while
facing a network disruption.
1.1 Background & Motivation
Supply chains are extremely complex networks consisting of critical nodes that are
essential for the achievement of operational and strategic initiatives (Blackhurst et al.,
2005; Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009; Pettit et al., 2010; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). They
are critical to the ability to meet demand and drive earnings, all the while playing an
instrumental role in the ability to develop advantages that set organizations apart from
competitors. Effective supply chains are a major driving factor of customer satisfaction,
and the inability to proactively mitigate and respond to an increasingly uncertain future
could have lasting and grave effects on the ability to sustain strategic operations and meet
customer demand (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011).
The importance of organizational resilience cannot be overstated. The ability to
recognize an uncertain future facilitates a greater level of preparedness needed to hedge
against downside risk (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011). Take, for example, the recent
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outbreaks of the coronavirus. Similar to the SARS outbreaks in 2003, the virus has
quickly spread to parts outside of Wuhan, China, impacting countries across the globe
(Otani, 2020). News of the outbreak hit financial markets especially hard. For instance,
the S&P 500 reacted accordingly by yielding the worst trading session in months (Otani,
2020). A rather optimistic view of 2020 global economic growth has been severely
dampened by the unknown economic impacts of the virus, further exacerbating the need
for proactively safeguarding organizational resources.
The ability of an organization to withstand the impact of a disruption has been
explored extensively in the literature. Resiliency tactics, such as the capability factors
presented by Pettit et al. (2010) and mitigation strategies proposed by Chopra and Sodhi
(2004), provide foundational insight as to the wide range of response options
organizations have at their disposal. Much of the developed research on supply chain
resiliency is qualitative in nature (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). Much of the quantitative
analysis is limited and provides minimal usefulness. A generalizable tool that measures
the practicality of qualitative strategies and can be implemented to gauge resiliency is
greatly lacking from a supply chain resiliency perspective.
In a military context, specifically the USAF’s F-16 repair network located in the
Pacific (PACAF), the level of vulnerabilities that exist due to environmental factors and
adversarial capabilities, create the continuous need to safeguard mission critical assets to
maintain operations. PACAF provides an ideal test case for the applicability of this tool.
For instance, PACAF features inherent flexibility due to the implementation of the repair
network integration (RNI) construct. Implemented to supplement local maintenance
capabilities, the RNI construct is meant to provide a holistic Air Force view of “off3

equipment repair capabilities” and “integrated, agile support” to the warfighter by
enhancing design and capability allocations across the repair network (RNIO et al.,
2016). Moreover, the RNI construct is aimed at eliminating repair of Intermediate-level
(I-level) and Depot-level (D-level) discrepancies in isolation to create a more robust and
flexible repair capability for USAF operations (RNIO et al., 2016).
PACAF currently features a relatively high level of repair flexibility regarding I-level
discrepancies for Avionics, Hydraulics, and Electrical & Environmental (E/E) at all four
operating locations. However, centralization exists for the I-level overhauls of the F110GE-129 engine. For instance, if a propulsion I-level discrepancy is identified at Osan
AFB, the entire engine is packed, wrapped, and shipped to the propulsion centralized
repair facility (CRF) located at Misawa AFB. Although centralization provides enormous
benefits from efficiency and economies of scale, it simultaneously increases the
vulnerabilities of the network (Tripp et al., 2010; Forbes & Wilson, 2018). Hence, if
Misawa experiences a disruption, the impacts and subsequent ability to perform F110GE-129 engine overhauls could be catastrophic.
1.2 Problem Statement
Decision makers must strike a balance between supply chain vulnerabilities and
supply chain capabilities (Pettit et al., 2010). Network outages due to disruptions are
often exacerbated due to the lack of visibility, connectedness among nodes, redundant
capability or just flat out underestimation (Tang, 2006). Hence, many of the tangible
losses organizations incur would be greatly diminished with a cost-effective, easily
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adaptable tool that provides decision makers the ability to quantify, analyze, and evaluate
the impact of predetermined asset allocations on disruption performance.
1.3 Research Questions
This research explores the following research questions to better understand how the
investment in resiliency impacts an organization’s ability to perform during a disruption.
Specifically, this research asks:
1. How do different investments in inventory and production capacity equate to
different levels of resilience across the sustainment network?
2. How should the investments in inventory and production capacity be allocated
across the sustainment network?
1.4 Research Overview
The research questions are answered through the analysis of a discrete-event
simulation (DES) model that quantifies the level of resilience resulting from various
levels of resilience investment. An extensive literature review draws upon the following
literature streams: general resilience strategies, investments in resilience, production
capacity and inventory tradeoff, and resilient design flexibility. The developed model is
then applied to PACAF. Subsequently, sustainment data and results are analyzed over the
different investment scenarios and network designs to identify resilience-cost
relationships. Lastly, findings, future research opportunities, and limitations are presented
to further facilitate a deeper understanding of resilience incorporation.

5

II. Literature Review
The following chapter provides an overview of the relevant research on supply chain
resiliency. Existing literature lacks a clear, generalizable way to quantify incremental
changes in network resilience due to the manipulation of resilience levers. Specifically,
USAF decision makers lack the ability to quantify how additional investments in
resilience equates to additional resilience. Much of the relevant literature streams have
focused on a reactive approach to mitigate supply chain disruptions. However, this
research provides decision makers insight into how network performance changes after a
disruption based on a predetermined asset allocation. The relevant literature streams
explored to address this gap include: general resilience strategies, investment in
resilience, production capacity and inventory tradeoff, and resilient design flexibility.
2.1 General Resilience Strategies
Supply chain resilience “is the ability of a system to return to its original state or
move to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004:2).
However, it has never been more elusive or necessary for supply chain decision makers
(Christopher & Peck, 2004; Forbes & Wilson, 2018). First and foremost, the concept of
supply chain resilience is relatively unexplained (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Blackhurst
et al., 2005; Wang & Ip, 2009). Furthermore, the rapid rise of globalization has led to
“increased consumer expectations, more global competition, longer and more complex
supply chains, and greater product variety with shorter product life cycles” (Sheffi &
Rice Jr., 2005:41). Subsequently, increased organizational complexity in conjunction
with a lack of known methods to tangibly implement and quantify resilience has given
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rapid rise to large-scale vulnerabilities that could drastically change the outlook of an
organization’s going concern (Blackhurst et al., 2005; Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009; Pettit
et al., 2010; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). Although disaster and contingency planning
have been widely explored, organizational contingency planning often exists in a silo,
embedded away from the necessary cohesiveness that is required to build a resilient
supply chain (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Carter and Rogers (2008) perform an extensive
literature review to formulate a holistic framework to implement Sustainable Supply
Chain Management (SSCM). Transparency and cohesiveness are greatly emphasized to
ensure the successful implementation of such strategies (Carter & Rogers, 2008).
Christopher and Peck (2004) assert that the lack of a foundational research base has
created the inability to fully comprehend the importance and breadth of resilience
incorporation in an organization’s supply chain. Moreover, decision makers lack
generalizable tools that can assist in gauging and implementing resilience into the supply
chain (Christopher & Peck, 2004). This research will provide a tangible method to
illustrate the importance of supply chain resilience incorporation and assist decision
makers in gauging current levels of resilience due to a predetermined allocation of
production capacity and inventory assets.
Craighead et al. (2007) argue that disruptions are inherently unavoidable; therefore,
risk is constant in supply chains. Direct correlations are drawn from the disruption
severity to the supply chain characteristics of density, node criticality, complexity,
recovery and warning (Craighead et al., 2007). Specific to recovery, the ability of an
organization to proactively and reactively allocate capacity in the event of a disruption
greatly mitigates the impact of a disruption on performance (Craighead et al., 2007).
7

Ivanov et al. (2014) and Ivanov (2018) introduce the propagation effect that may occur
without the proper recovery implementation. Although both proactive capacity and
reactive capacity allocations work best in unison, proactive recovery capacity is more
effective at limiting the propagation of the disruption throughout the entire supply chain.
The literature presents copious amounts of varying definitions for the numerous
resilience levers at the decision maker’s authority. Using the definitions set forth in the
literature, this research creates a method to add practicality to the many definitions that
have been created.
Sheffi and Rice Jr. (2005) equate supply chain resilience to the reduction in
probability of a disruption occurrence, thus, reducing overall system vulnerabilities.
Specifically, resilience is created with the addition of inherent system flexibility and built
in redundancy (Sheffi & Rice Jr., 2005). Melnyk et al. (2013) build upon this basic
resilient structure by attributing the resilience of an organization’s supply chain to the
utilization of capacity to resist and recover from a disruption. Additionally, they
recommend analyzing the system’s transient states when measuring the impact of a
disruption, and ultimately the network’s cumulative resilience. Figure 1 illustrates the
time periods associated with Melynk et al. (2013) concept of resistance and recovery
capacity. An organization’s ability to resist the impact of a disruption can be
characterized by taking the integral above the curve for the time period TO – TP, while
the ability to recover from a disruption can be characterized by taking the integral above
the time period TP – TR (Melnyk et al., 2013). The smaller this integral, the greater the
ability of an organization to resist and recover from a disruption (Melnyk et al., 2013).
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Figure 1: Disruption Time Periods (Melnyk et al., 2013)
This research also emphasizes the need of an organization to resist and recover from a
disruption. However, and contrary to Melnyk et al. (2013), this research integrates the
area under the curve (AUC) which provides a more accurate measure of cumulative
network performance over the specified disruption time period (Femano et al., 2019).
Additionally, the AUC provides a greater ability to analyze the impacts of resilience
investments on network performance because it provides a forecast of the level of
demand that can be met resulting from predetermined assets in the event of a disruption
(Femano et al., 2019).
Blackhurst et al. (2005) recognize the need for resilience stemming from larger
supply chains and increased dispersion. More specifically, the rise of global sourcing and
transition to efficient operations, such as the incorporation of agility and lower inventory
levels, further emphasizes the need for built-in resilience (Blackhurst et al., 2005;
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Tang & Tomlin, 2008; Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009; Pettit et
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al., 2010; Schmitt & Singh, 2012). Blackhurst et al. (2005) offer insightful analyses on
disruption discovery, disruption recovery, and network redesign by conducting a “major
multi-industry, multi-methodology, empirical study” which highlights general disruption
behavior from an extremely broad perspective (Blackhurst et al., 2005:4078). However,
the research is strictly qualitative and offers no quantification of various network
redesigns or recovery strategies. Therefore, this research seeks to add to the largely
conceptual nature of supply chain resilience literature by quantifying incremental changes
in resilience.
2.2 Investment in Resilience
One of the issues with designing the supply chain for resilience is that much of the
literature on resilience incorporation is conceptual in nature. Hence, a quantifiable
method and tool that tests different resilience strategies will pay dividends for USAF
decision makers when making resource allocation decisions.
Sheffi (2001) focuses primarily on the probability of a deliberate attack on a firm’s
supply chain. Sheffi (2001) asserts that three main investment strategies exist that will
maximize an organization’s resilience: (1) supplier relationships, (2) inventory
management, and (3) knowledge and process backup. Sheffi identifies the cost tradeoff
that exists between using local suppliers versus offshore suppliers. Although the use of
local suppliers is more expensive, they offer quicker lead times. The use of offshore
suppliers is often less expensive; however, the lead time is much longer (Sheffi, 2001).
The concept of “Strategic Safety Stock,” which describes bolstered inventory levels used
in the event of a disruption, is a useful way to help smooth out system performance level
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during disruption impact (Sheffi, 2001; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Tang, 2006; Liu et al.,
2016). Tang (2006) echoes similar sentiment when recommending robust supply chain
strategies. In particular, the use of “strategic stock” aids firms in responding to a wide
range of demand when a disruption occurs (Tang, 2006). The use of redundant resources
to increase network resiliency is not a new concept. Wang and Ip (2009) illustrate the
impact of redundant, flexible, and decentralized resources on an aircraft servicing supply
chain by modeling various levels of resilience. However, managerial insight into the
different cost relationships between the various resilient concepts is not offered.
Christopher and Peck (2004) develop four main concepts for creating supply chain
resilience: (1) resilience should be inherent to the system, (2) a high level of
organizational cohesiveness is needed if risk is going to be managed, (3) the ability to
lower response time is critical, and (4) risk management culture must be embedded in the
identity of an organization. Additionally, Christopher and Peck (2004) identify the
importance of the inherent tradeoff between expanded capacity and increased inventory,
which provides added flexibility when coping with the impacts of unforeseen disruptions
or demand surges (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Christopher & Peck, 2004; Tomlin, 2006;
Lücker et al., 2019).
Pettit et al. (2010) introduce three propositions that identify the sought after “zone of
resilience.” This equilibrium balances an organization’s capabilities with the
organization’s vulnerabilities (Pettit et al., 2010). They assert that if a supply chain does
not sufficiently invest to develop capabilities to offset the negative impacts of its
vulnerabilities, excessive risk will occur. Conversely, excessive investment into risk
mitigation capabilities will eventually begin to consume profitability (Pettit et al., 2010).
11

Additionally, Pettit et al. (2010) identify 14 mitigation capabilities that aim to address
system vulnerabilities. In other words, networks that are prone to disruptions with limited
resilience capabilities often place themselves in situations with excessive risk. Networks
that invest heavily in the ability to mitigate vulnerabilities may be over investing and
experience diminishing returns on those capabilities (Pettit et al., 2010). This research
seeks to provide a method for striking a balance between network capabilities and
network vulnerabilities.
In the time leading up to a disruption, whether anticipated or unforeseen, firms have
numerous options at their disposal to help mitigate or respond to the event of a disruption
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Tomlin, 2006; Yang et al., 2009). Yang et al. (2009) examine
how the numerous risk management strategies change when one entity is faced with
asymmetric information (Yang et al., 2009). Specifically, Yang et al. (2009) examine the
necessary adoption of mitigation tactics and associated costs for organizations when
facing asymmetric information. Tomlin (2006) and Ivanov et al. (2014) assert that
mitigation tactics are proactive in nature, thus, if the firm decides to proceed, a cost will
be incurred even if a disruption does not occur. For instance, if a firm builds excess
inventory in anticipation of a disruption, the acquisition cost and holding costs are
incurred even if the disruption does not occur (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). A firm may also
want to proceed with a contingency tactic, which is inherently reactive in the sense that
the firm only enacts this strategy if a disruption has occurred (Tomlin, 2006; Ivanov et
al., 2014). For instance, in the event of a disruption, a firm may be able to shift
production from one supplier to another (Tomlin, 2006). Tomlin (2006) highlights that
the firm need not proceed with only one of these tactics, and that the greatest benefit in
12

added resiliency comes from an investment in simultaneous resilience tactics. Investing
in isolation leads to inefficiencies within the system (Femano et al., 2019). This research
applies this insight when balancing production capacity and inventory investments.
Schmitt and Singh (2012) build upon the mitigation and contingency tactic strategies
of Tomlin (2006) by utilizing discrete-event simulation (DES) to illustrate the impacts of
inventory placement and other methods. Using a real-world example of a consumerpackaged goods company, Schmitt and Singh (2012) and Snyder et al. (2012) emphasize
the importance of capacity to mitigate a disruption impact shown by varying the level of
capacity and response time. Although the use of disruption capacity is extremely
important in a firm’s ability to recover, the reaction time of the disruption capacity is
often more important than the capacity itself (Schmitt & Singh, 2012; Femano et al.,
2019). For instance, following a disruption, a 20% increase in capacity with a 1-week
reaction time better mitigated the disruption impact than a 50% capacity increase with a
4-week reaction time (Schmitt & Singh, 2012). The speed at which a firm reacts to a
disruption can often have the greatest impact on mitigation and recovery (Schmitt &
Singh, 2012; Femano et al., 2019).
2.3 Production Capacity and Inventory Tradeoff
Decision makers are continuously challenged to maximize specific outputs given a
finite level of resources to do so. Both in a commercial and military context, maximizing
the availability of parts, equipment, and systems are of the highest priority (Sleptchenko
et al., 2003). Given the inherent nature of network vulnerabilities, disruptions, and finite
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resources, the investment tradeoff between resilience levers is an integral part of any
supply chain.
Maximizing the availability of any system entails two primary methods: increasing
inventory or reducing throughput times (Sleptchenko et al., 2003). Increasing system
inventory to buffer against longer than usual throughput times and increasing capacity to
shorten throughput times leaves decision makers with an interesting paradox
(Sleptchenko et al., 2003). As Tomlin (2006) highlights, the isolated investment in a
single capability will be limited without the simultaneous investment in multiple
capabilities. In other words, if capacity is proactively and reactively increased without
supplementing inventory, the full potential of the capacity will not be realized, and vice
versa (Femano et al., 2019). Hence, decision makers are faced with an extremely
challenging dilemma: how does a firm simultaneously invest in resilience capabilities to
maximize the availability of a given system?
Sleptchenko et al. (2003) take a two-pronged approach to address this problem. Using
the VARI-METRIC procedure for parts inventory within a repair network, Sleptchenko et
al. (2003) model a similar multi-echelon repair network consisting of local and depotlevel repair capabilities and illustrate the following: First, given a finite budget constraint,
the goal is to maximize cumulative system availability. Second, given a specified
availability target, an approach to minimize the investment costs is taken using the
tradeoff of spare parts and production capacity (Sleptchenko et al., 2003). Although
valuable insight into the cost relationships between spare inventory and capacity is
provided, a resilience-building approach was not taken. This research incorporates a
randomized disruption to measure the cost-resilience relationships between various levels
14

of inventory and capacity and captures the overall impact on system performance over a
specified time period.
Lücker et al. (2019) use the concept of reserve mitigation inventory (RMI) and
reserve capacity to minimize the impact of an unforeseen disruption at a single location.
Lücker et al. (2019) utilize RMI in a reactive manner contrary to the resistance concept
developed by Melnyk et al. (2013). However, immediately following a disruption, the
firm may use both measures instantaneously. Realistically, a time period will exist before
an organization is able to respond. Under stochastic demand, Lücker et al. (2019) offer
valuable insight into the optimal investment strategy of RMI and reserve capacity by
evaluating the following risk strategies: inventory, reserve capacity, mixed, and passive
(Lücker et al., 2019). This research quantifies resilience changes based on the investment
in predetermined production capacity allocations, all the while emphasizing the need for
the simultaneous increase in spare inventory.
2.4 Resilient Design Flexibility
Perhaps the single most important mitigation strategy an organization may utilize is in
the flexibility design of its network. Process and design flexibility are essential in
allowing organizations to vary their level of responsiveness while facing continuous
uncertainties (Jordan & Graves, 1995). Flexibility is defined here as the ability to
“restructure previously existing” production capacity to best mitigate and facilitate
system recovery (Carvalho et al., 2012). Inventory is an excellent way to bolster
resilience while facing continuous uncertainties (Sheffi, 2001; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004;
Tang, 2006; Liu et al., 2016). Proactive mitigation techniques, particularly, the
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stockpiling of inventory can be extremely expensive (Tomlin, 2006). Therefore, Liu et al.
(2016) introduce the concept of virtual stockpile pooling (VSP). Aimed at lowering the
massive holding costs associated with higher inventory levels, VSP differentiates from
the dedicated stockpile and integrated stockpile approach by “allocating the integrated
stockpile amongst multiple locations” (Liu et al., 2016:1746). This approach enables
transshipments to compensate for locations that are below their allocated stock levels
(Liu et al., 2016). It does so by creating thresholds or “red lines” representing the amount
that a location can go above or below its allocated threshold. Fluctuations beyond the
allocated threshold are dependent upon the ability of another location to compensate by
increasing or decreasing its allocated threshold (Liu et al., 2016). In theory, the
implementation of VSP for an Air Force repair network could prove beneficial; however,
the quantity and localized nature of less severe repairs does not create the need for VSP
incorporation within the scope of this research. Although, used in a proactive and reactive
manner, bolstered inventory levels drastically reduce the impact on performance levels of
organizations following a disruption (Sheffi, 2001; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Tang, 2006;
Liu et al., 2016; Femano et al., 2019).
Saghafian and Van Oyen (2011) highlight that a flexible design can be achieved by
incorporating a backup supplier and gathering risk information through the use of
primary suppliers. When facing the reality of finite budgets and the prospect of unreliable
suppliers, a process is derived that assists in identifying which primary suppliers should
be backed up (Saghafian & Van Oyen, 2011). This assumes that the achievement of full
flexibility (backing up all primary suppliers) is not cost feasible (Saghafian & Van Oyen,
2016). This approach “backs up” or bolsters the investment in production capacity prior
16

to the disruption occurring based on expected demand. In the context of a military repair
network, strategic vulnerability assessments would occur to identify which nodes would
benefit the most from redundant capabilities based on adversarial capabilities, location,
and mission criticality.
Forbes and Wilson (2018) highlight the need for supply chain flexibility by
introducing a case study on a wine distribution supply chain in Christ Church, New
Zealand during the devastating earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. Although specific to the
wine distribution industry, Forbes and Wilson (2018) examine organizational capabilities
by comprehensively analyzing each entity’s pre-event readiness, disruption response
efforts, and long-term recovery efforts after a disruption occurred (Forbes & Wilson,
2018). Specifically, Forbes and Wilson (2018) identify the critical need for capital
expenditure decentralization. Although decentralization can be costly, the inherent
“geographical dispersion and flexibility” facilitated a greater performance level during
the disruption than that of their competitors (Forbes & Wilson, 2018:486). However, not
all organizations have the financial capability for such measures. Therefore, organizations
should aim to strike the delicate balance between network capabilities and vulnerabilities
(Pettit et al., 2010). This research examines the impacts on network performance by
varying the level of flexibility that is inherent to the PACAF network design.
2.4.1 Long Chain Flexibility Approach
Effectively designing the network to efficiently allocate capacity in a proactive
manner allows cumulative network performance to better withstand any impact that may
arise due to a disruptive event (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011). Building upon the added
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benefits of flexibility incorporation, the “long chain” or “one chain” strategy, introduced
by Jordan and Graves (1995) describes a flexibility approach that connects all production
plants and serviceable products by “product assignment decisions” (Jordan & Graves,
1995:577). For instance, two plants can service each product, and each plant only
services two products (Graves & Tomlin, 2003). This concept is illustrated by using the
example of ten production plants and ten products, each with their own individual
demand. The “no flexibility” design highlights an instance where each plant produces
only one product and yields a cumulative capacity utilization of only 85.3% (Jordan &
Graves, 1995). Next, the “full flexibility” example provides each plant the ability to
produce every product. This design yields a capacity utilization of 95.4%; however, the
cost of doing so is not feasible (Jordan & Graves, 1995). Graves and Tomlin (2003) build
upon this concept by developing a process flexibility framework. The stark differences in
the various network design structures are illustrated in Figure 2, which uses the terms
“long chain” and “one chain” interchangeably. Although the “three chain” and “one
chain” strategies have an equal number of links, the ability to meet demand, as indicated
by sales and capacity utilization greatly benefits the “one chain” design (Jordan &
Graves, 1995). As mentioned, the “total flexibility” approach yields similar results to the
“one chain” design. However, the cost of “total flexibility” greatly exceeds that of “one
chain,” or partial flexibility (Jordan & Graves, 1995). For the remainder of this research,
this flexibility strategy will be referred to as the “long chain” structure.
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Figure 2: Various Flexibility Configurations (Graves & Tomlin, 2003)
The long chain structure allows the incorporation of flexibility into the system design,
thereby, easing the shift of capacity to handle random fluctuations in demand from plant
to plant, which facilitates a higher performance level (Graves & Tomlin, 2003).
Additionally, flexibility incorporation allows quicker response times without sacrificing
costs of buffer inventory and buffer capacity (Simchi-Levi & Wei, 2012). This research
utilizes the long chain flexibility approach by illustrating the associated benefits when
facing a disruption. Although the PACAF network design is inherently flexible, the cost
of operational expansion would prove infeasible. The impacts on cumulative network
performance resulting from the incorporation of the long chain structure and the resulting
cost savings are illustrated in the methodology and results sections.
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2.5 Literature Conclusion
This research builds upon the supply chain resilience literature by measuring the
impact of different resilience strategies. Specifically, this research addresses the
identified literature gap by incorporating the outlined flexibility approaches in
conjunction with the inherent tradeoff between inventory and production capacity to
quantify how additional investment in the resilience levers equates to additional levels of
resilience. More importantly, this tool builds upon the literature foundation by providing
essential insight into the inherent cost-resilience relationships to better facilitate network
performance in the event of a disruption.
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III. Methodology
This research addresses the gap in the literature by developing a simulation model to
incrementally quantify the impact of resilience investment. The PACAF F-16 repair
network is modeled to demonstrate the degree to which resiliency is currently
incorporated and to determine how varying the level of investment and network designs
impact cumulative network resilience. The identified resilience levers are spare
inventory, production capacity, and the speed at which a disruption response occurs. A
comprehensive examination of resilience lever manipulation and its subsequent impact on
the pre-disruption and post-disruption performance levels will provide key insight as to
the optimal allocation of resources across the network. The examination of key variables
on the system’s ability to resist the occurrence of a disruption, mitigate the impact on
performance level, and expedite recovery after a disruption has occurred will provide a
system’s approach to examining network resilience levels.
The adopted research methodology consists of the following steps:

Figure 3: Adopted Research Methodology
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3.1 Conceptual Design
This research models the impact of a network disruption on the PACAF F-16 repair
network as it is currently structured. Furthermore, various network designs are proposed
and tested using the numerous flexibility approaches outlined in the literature. Repair
network operations located at Misawa AFB, Kunsan AFB, Osan AFB, and Eielson AFB
are modeled by incorporating four individual Product Repair Groups (PRGs): Propulsion,
Avionics, Hydraulics and Electrical & Environmental (E/E). The distribution of resources
(capital fixtures necessary for repair) for each location are based off the quantity of
resources for the F-16 C & D models located at Shaw AFB. For instance, identified
quantities of production capacity at Shaw AFB are distributed to each location in PACAF
in proportion to the amount of allocated aircraft located at each base. Table 1 illustrates
the back shop capacity allocation for the initial baseline system.
Table 1: Baseline System Capacity Allocation
Back Shop Eielson Osan Kunsan Misawa Total
Propulsion
2
2
4
4
12
Avionics
3
3
5
6
17
Hydraulics
1
2
3
3
9
E/E
1
1
2
2
6
Prop CRF
5
5
Total
7
8
14
20
49

3.2 Data Collection
The Air Force’s Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support-Enterprise View
(LIMS-EV) was utilized as the primary source of data. LIMS-EV is the “single entry
point” or consolidated warehouse of Air Force logistics data and was created to ensure
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“one version of the truth” for all logistics data exploitation (Petcoff, 2010). Therefore,
this research relies heavily upon the accessibility and accuracy of the consolidated
database. When identifying and gathering the necessary data, all results were filtered to
contain the relevant metrics for the chosen network and chosen airframe. Sortie quantity,
flying hours, total aircraft inventory (TAI), and break rates were gathered and
incorporated from various dashboards located within LIMS-EV. Furthermore, specific
line replaceable unit (LRU) data is gathered from the DLR Flying Dashboard.
Additionally, small focus groups with each PRG back shop were held that facilitated
discussion and validation of model assumptions. Conversations with subject matter
experts (SMEs) were utilized to gather pipeline times between critical nodes during the
repair process. Empirical data was gathered and consolidated from notes based on firsthand experience at Shaw AFB. Table 2 shows a consolidated list of gathered and
incorporated data, while Table 3 illustrates the 2018 system parameters that are
incorporated into the simulation at time 0. Additionally, Custodian Inventory Reports
(R14s) were gathered from each PRG back shop located at Shaw AFB which contains the
item description, quantity on-hand, and original acquisition cost of all capital fixtures
necessary to perform repairs. The repair cycle time (RCT) was gathered for the
incorporated LRUs from SMEs located at the 635th Supply Chain Operations Wing
(SCOW).
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Table 2: Consolidated Data Sources
Data
2018 Sortie Generation Data
2018 PACAF Break Data
PACAF Transportation Data
PRG Categorization
NSN Demand Data
NSN Cost Data
Repair Cycle Time (RCT)
Custodian Inventory Report (R14)
CAPEX Estimates

Data Source
LIMS-EV: Weapon System View
LIMS-EV: Weapon System View
USTRANSCOM
LIMS-EV: Cost of Logistics
LIMS-EV: Supply Chain
Management View
D200: Dr. Marvin Arostegui
635th SCOW: MSgt Marr
PACAF SMEs
Historical Air Force Construction
Cost Handbook (2007)

Table 3: 2018 System Parameters
Base
Eielson
Osan
Kunsan
Misawa

AC* Sortie Quant* Total FH*
2000
4000
25
3000
5000
25
25
5000
8000
25
6000
9000

Break Rate Sorties/Day* Hrs/Sort* DDay Prob
13.82
7.69
2.00
0.25
0.25
13.82
11.54
1.67
19.23
1.60
0.25
13.82
0.25
13.82
23.08
1.50

*Data changed in accordance to Distribution Statement A
3.3 Baseline System Description
This research utilizes SIMIO, a discrete-event simulation software well suited for the
design and emulation of complex, multi-layered problem sets requiring the use of many
experimental designs (Femano et al., 2019). To develop the most accurate representation
of the network, conversations with RNI Node Managers located at the SCOW were used
to validate repair capability assumptions for each modeled location. The validity of using
repair operations from Shaw AFB to model bases in PACAF was validated with SMEs.
The back shops in PACAF for the associated PRGs all have I-level capabilities except for
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the propulsion capability. Operations are modeled by accurately duplicating the routing
of broken LRUs within each PRG. Each base contains flight line maintenance and the
respective back shop for each PRG. As broken LRUs are generated, the PRG that
contains the specific LRU is determined and used exclusively to route the part to the
appropriate back shop. Depending upon the severity, I-level breaks may be laterally
shipped to the base with the current capacity to perform the repair. I-level repairs may be
laterally shipped to the base that is most in need. Therefore, the network contains
organizational (O-level) and intermediate (I-level) capabilities. The only centralized
repair facility (CRF) is the propulsion back shop located at Misawa AFB. As breaks are
identified, and it is determined to be an engine, Eielson, Kunsan, and Osan all pack,
wrap, and ship whole engines to the Misawa propulsion CRF for repair. Therefore,
excluding propulsion, all local back shops possess I-level capabilities. Depot level
maintenance is not within the scope of this research.
Table 3 shows the quantity of assigned aircraft to each operating location in USAF’s
PACAF theater. Flying operations are conducted using 2018 flying schedule data. The
data is used to create an interarrival time of breaks as an exponentially distributed
function of the number of aircraft allocated to each base, the sortie quantity, flying hours,
and cumulative PACAF break rate. The interarrival time is given by:

𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
)/(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 )
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (
where,

𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊 represents the total flying hours for base i,
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(1)

𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊 is the total number of mission capable aircraft at any given time for base i,

𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 is the average number of sorties using a 260-day flying schedule for base i,
𝑯𝑯𝒊𝒊 is the average duration in hours of each sortie for base i.

As an entity is generated (break occurs), an LRU is assigned, which corresponds to a
PRG, thereby determining the routing of the part in the repair process. LRU assignment is
based upon the 2018 annual demand for each LRU determined in LIMS-EV.
As the discrepancy is identified by flight line maintenance, crews will determine the
PRG and ultimately the LRU that has failed. As Table 4 and Table 5 illustrate, a severity
of 1 to 4 is assigned to all breaks for propulsion, avionics, E/E, and hydraulics. The
propulsion severity mix is drawn from a separate table to enable this research to more
accurately reflect the number of propulsion I-level discrepancies. As the LRU arrives at
the appropriate back shop, the associated repair cycle time is determined and assigned as
a random exponential distribution. The repair cycle time was assigned to each LRU by
using a weighted average based off the corresponding annual demand for each LRU.
However, if an engine was routed to the propulsion CRF, a processing time of 30-days is
used to represent an accurate depiction of the amount of time to turn the engine
serviceable. The weighted average was necessary to realize the benefits from incremental
investment in production capacity. The weighted average raised the repair time for higher
demanded items, thus allowing a queue to build at the associated back shops. The
baseline structure features one propulsion CRF. If a propulsion LRU is generated, and
severity 4 is assigned, the entire engine is dropped and routed to the CRF located at
Misawa. For propulsion, avionics, E/E, and hydraulics, severities 1 to 3 are routed
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directly to the local back shop. Excluding propulsion, lateral shipments of severity 4
breaks are permitted which provides the flexibility to ship the part to the base which
currently has the available capacity to perform the repair. As the part is repaired at the
back shop, the repaired part will be shipped to the base that is currently most in need,
where the part will be placed on an awaiting aircraft or increase local on-hand spare
inventory as depicted in Figure 5.
Table 4: Avionics, Hydraulics, & E/E Severity Mix
Eng Sev
1
2
3
4

Sev Mix
0.45
0.13
0.17
0.25

Rpr Lvl BSProcessingTime (Hrs)
O-Level
LRU RCT
O-Level
LRU RCT
O-Level
LRU RCT
I-Level
LRU RCT

Prop CRF (Days)
-

Table 5: Propulsion Severity Mix
Eng Sev
1
2
3
4

Sev Mix
0.35
0.25
0.2
0.2

Rpr Lvl BSProcessingTime (Hrs)
Prop CRF (Days)
O-Level
LRU RCT
O-Level
LRU RCT
O-Level
LRU RCT
I-Level
Random.Exponential (30)

3.4 Model Verification & Validation
Extensive model verification occurred using the model trace function in SIMIO.
Tracing allows the step-by-step tracking of individual entities flowing from node to node
throughout the duration of the repair process. A method was followed that verified the
precise location of each entity within the simulation. This verification ensured the proper
assignment of specific PRGs and subsequently, LRUs, which led to the verification of
routing to the appropriate back shop and/or CRF. Model assumption validation was
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achieved based on continuous feedback from conversations with SMEs located at Shaw
AFB, the 635th SCOW, and PACAF. Time series outputs of total throughput, processing
times, and queues were generated to validate system performance over time.
Each iteration completion generated system statistics that provided metrics such as
the number of breaks specific to each location, number of repairs specific to each
location, and system utilization metrics such as throughput and time in system.
Utilization metrics were validated with phone calls to SMEs located at the specific back
shops in PACAF.
3.5 Scenario Development
Baseline scenarios were first developed to aid in the verification and validation
process and to gain a fundamental understanding of the system’s performance levels.
Baseline scenarios were generated with current PACAF repair capabilities to provide an
accurate representation of system behavior over time. All scenarios were run over a
2,000-day time period with an incorporated warm-up period of 1200-days. Due to the
size and inherent complexities of the model, a 1200-day warm-up period was necessary.
Although system statistics are generated for an 800-day time period, this research
primarily focuses on the transient states of performance. For instance, a randomized
disruption occurs at day 1400. Regardless of the response time frame, all scenarios have
recovered by day 1600. Therefore, from day 1400 to 1600, the AUC is utilized to
evaluate system performance. The baseline structure represents the PACAF F-16 repair
network as it is currently structured. Therefore, all other resilience scenarios and network
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designs will be compared to the baseline structure in both performance and cost over the
specified time period.
This research uses the following classifiers to identify the time periods of interest
during a disruption:

Pre-Disruption: Day 1200 to day 1400
Post Disruption – Decline: The time at which the disruption occurs until a specified
response has been enacted.
Post Disruption – Recovery: Time at which the response occurs until the system
performance has recovered (Day 1600).

Existing within the post disruption time period is the AUC metric used to quantify the
level of demand the network can meet during the Post Disruption - Decline and Recovery
periods. The AUC for each period is described as follows (Femano et al., 2019):

Area under the Curve – Decline (AUC-Decline): The total network performance under
the Post Disruption – Decline curve.
Area under the Curve – Recovery (AUC – Recovery): The total network performance
under the Post Disruption – Recovery curve.
Area under the Curve – Total (AUC – Total): Cumulative network performance during
all stages of the disruption.

The primary resilience levers are production capacity and response time. However,
the simultaneous investment in spare inventory is essential to realize the greatest benefit
from increased capacity (Femano et al., 2019). All expanding scenarios include some
allocation of inventory, production capacity, and a varying response time. Table 6
29

illustrates the developed scenarios used for the baseline structure. A cost and
performance threshold of 80% MC Rate was used to scope the number of needed
scenarios. Baseline structure capacity is varied up to a 30% increase of the originally
assigned allocations, while the capacity used to recover from the disruption is increased
up to 50% of the initial capacity allocation. Additionally, the scenarios in Table 6 were
used in conjunction with a 10, 20, 30, and 40-day response time to emphasize the
importance of an expedited response. All designed scenarios were evaluated using the
developed AUC metric, in addition to the network’s cumulative mission capable (MC)
rate. Moreover, 100 replications were performed on each scenario. The AUC is used as
the primary metric of resilience because it provides a more accurate representation of
system behavior and the ability to meet demand over the disrupted time period.
Table 6: Developed Baseline Scenarios
Initial System
System Recovery
System Recovery
Scenario Initial Capacity Scenario Initial Capacity
Capacity
Capacity
1
1.00
13
1.00
2
1.10
14
1.10
3
1.20
15
1.20
1.00
1.20
4
1.30
16
1.30
5
1.40
17
1.40
6
1.50
18
1.50
7
1.00
19
1.00
8
1.10
20
1.10
9
1.20
21
1.20
1.10
1.30
10
1.30
22
1.30
11
1.40
23
1.40
12
1.50
24
1.50
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As replications are completed, SIMIO produces and exports a comma separated value
(CSV) file for each replication. The baseline scenarios outlined by Table 6 produced
2,400 CSVs for one response time (100 files for each scenario). After all developed
scenarios have been completed, the CSVs are imported into MATLAB, which
consolidates, batches, and integrates the area under the curve for each scenario.
MATLAB then produces a consolidated table containing the time period metrics
associated with each scenario that are used for investment and design comparison. All
consolidation, batching, and integration code can be seen in detail in appendix B, C, and
D.
3.6 Flexibility Design
In addition to varying amounts of predetermined resilience levers, network design
performance is evaluated using the process flexibility approach introduced by Jordan and
Graves (1995) and Simchi-Levi and Wei (2012) in the literature. The process flexibility
approach assumes a finite amount of network production capacity and varying amounts
of connectedness among repair nodes. For instance, the baseline structure is rather robust,
and all locations have avionics, hydraulics, and E/E capabilities. For propulsion,
however, centralization exists for I-level capabilities. Hence, the baseline system
provides adequate resistance to disruptions that are enacted upon it. However, if the CRF
at Misawa for propulsion is affected, the subsequent events that follow and the impact on
the network’s ability to perform engine overhauls would be disastrous. Therefore, various
levels of flexibility were implemented and tested using allocations of network resources
to do so.
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This research employs two additional designs selected for their stark cost/resilience
difference when facing uncertain futures. Each location is assigned the initial amount of
production capacity in proportion to the amount of allocated aircraft as presented in Table
1. The employed network designs strategically increment capacity at various locations to
illustrate the impact on the network’s ability to maintain system throughput at the back
shops in the event of lost capacity at a location. Figure 4 illustrates the differences
between the various network designs.

Figure 4: Developed Network Designs
The second design uses the long chain flexibility approach developed by Jordan and
Graves (1995). This approach is extremely beneficial for system designs that feature
limited flexibility incorporation. However, as the baseline structure is rather flexible
regarding the allocation of repair capabilities, it is not flexible when capacity is
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considered. This research employs the long chain approach to illustrate an alternative
design to achieve desired levels of flexibility at tremendous cost savings. The inability to
alter PACAF as it is currently structured is recognized. Therefore, we posit the use of the
long chain strategy to recommend methods of future capacity expansion. As Jordan and
Graves (1995) describe, the capacity for each PRG is allocated to exactly two locations.
Every location possesses the ability to perform repairs for exactly two PRGs, which
forms “one chain” flexibility as illustrated in Figure 2 and disperses cumulative risk
(Jordan & Graves, 1995). The third design, or simple allocation structure, supplements all
existing recovery capacity at non-impacted locations with Misawa’s production capacity
(greatest quantity). Chosen to illustrate the impacts of significantly increasing recovery
capacity on the AUC, this design illustrates the cost associated with a higher level of
resilience. Additionally, the simple allocation structure realizes a large increase in spare
inventory across all locations to illustrate the need for simultaneous investment to support
the increase in production capacity. Furthermore, multiple propulsion CRFs are utilized
to show the benefits of centralization dispersion. All developed designs are evaluated
using the experimentation function in SIMIO to allow the simultaneous manipulation of
the identified resilience levers. Additionally, all established designs possess the ability to
laterally ship I-level discrepancies.
The long chain structure increases levels of recovery capacity only. The simple
allocation structure does not realize an additional investment in initial or recovery
capacity due to the extremely large initial resilience investment. Furthermore, the long
chain structure increases up to 210% of the original long chain initial capacity allocation.
The large investment increase in the long chain scenarios was cost feasible and necessary
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to reach Pre-Disruption MC Rates. Similar to the simple allocation structure, the long
chain structure’s large increase in recovery capacity warranted an increase in spare
inventory for the design.
3.7 Disruption Incorporation
All developed scenarios were run using predetermined resilience levers over 2,000days to gain a fundamental understanding of the impacts of simultaneously manipulating
resilience levers on cumulative system performance. To gauge system performance and
to determine the level of system resilience, all developed scenarios were run with the
incorporation of a randomized disruption (DDay) at day 1400, where, as Table 3
illustrates, a disruption eliminates all the repair capabilities specific to one location via an
equal probability. After a specified delay, it is assumed all aircraft that were located at the
impacted location are equally distributed to the three remaining bases. Moreover, this
research assumes that operations at the impacted location are unrecoverable and
therefore, lost for the remaining duration of the simulation. Furthermore, process logic
prevents all subsequent I-level breaks from being routed to the impacted location. Figure
5 illustrates the general pre- and post-disruption behavior.
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Figure 5: Post-Disruption Behavior
3.8 Resilience Measurement
Consistent with Melnyk et al. (2013), this research argues that system resilience is
most accurately assessed during the system’s transient states. Shown in Figure 6, each
simulation iteration was broken into three distinct time periods as described in section 3.5
(Femano et al., 2019). This research builds upon the foundation set forth in the literature
by using the identified concepts to illustrate and quantify the effects of simultaneous
manipulation of resilience levers on each of the three time periods. As Figure 6
illustrates, the system’s resistance to the disruptive event occurs in the Pre-Disruption
time period of the simulation. The recovery of the system begins at the Minimum
Performance Level (MPL) of the system during the disruptive event and ends in the Post
Disruption – Recovery time period.
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Figure 6: Performance Metrics & Disruption Time Periods (Femano et al., 2019)
This research employs the concept of the AUC to quantify the number of MC days
that the system can support resulting from various levels of resilience investment
(Femano et al., 2019). Contrary to Melnyk et al. (2013), who employ the use of the area
above the disruption curve, this research argues that the AUC provides a more accurate
representation of cumulative performance over the disruption time period. The area above
the curve measures lost performance in the event of a disruption, which ultimately,
deemphasizes network starting performance (Femano et al., 2019). Additionally, this
research further develops a generalizable resilience metric, which represents the networks
achieved AUC in proportion to the desired AUC, or total realized demand over the
disruption time period (Femano et al., 2019).

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡

(2)

This metric proves extremely generalizable because regardless of the organization, it will
experience some drop in performance resulting from a disruption, and it will experience
some level of demand that must be met during the disruption. Hence, this resilience
metric provides an indication of the level of demand that can be met due to various levels
of resilience investment. The analysis and results section builds upon the associated time
periods and AUC by introducing the various time period metrics illustrated in Figure 6.
3.9 Cost Assignment
Essential to the foundation of this research is the ability to monetarily quantify
varying levels of investment. Cost estimates of the associated capacity and inventory
allocations, as well as the capital expenditures necessary to house them, allows decision
makers to associate the required level of investment needed to reach a desired level of
resilience. This research employs USAF R14s to assign a cost to the ability to perform a
simultaneous repair at each specific back shop. For example, the propulsion R14 for
Shaw AFB was used as the basis of cost for one unit of incremental capacity across all
propulsion locations in the developed scenarios. Cost was linearly assigned to provide a
representation of the necessary investment.
Spare inventory quantities were gathered specific to each location using the D200
database. Furthermore, the cost of each LRU was gathered from D200 and linearly
assigned to each incremental unit of spare inventory.
An accurate representation of the necessary capital expenditures is essential for
illustrating the benefits of the long chain strategy. Hence, generalizable costs associated
with the CAPEX repair facilities were gathered using the Historical Air Force
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Construction Cost Handbook (2007). Costs were determined using the given size (square
feet) and cost per square foot. Additionally, location specific factors, which account for
the specific costs of construction associated with each modeled location, were used in
generating a final cost estimate.
Lastly, the cost of personnel needed at each location was determined by taking the
average annual base pay of personnel with the pay grade of E-1 to E-7 with 2 through 20
years in service to generate an average annual salary. This figure was multiplied by the
number of individuals located at each repair back shop across all locations. This research
recognizes that as the level of production capacity increases, so too does need for
personnel. Hence, the cost of personnel is increased by the cost percentage increase in
production capacity as compared to the initial production capacity investment for each
design.
An important distinction must be made regarding cost assignment. All incorporated
costs represent the fixed costs necessary to perform a repair. Personnel, however, border
the line between fixed and operational costs. Personnel costs are included for the purpose
of this research because personnel are a fixed requirement for a given repair capability
over the time periods for which the model is run.

38

IV. Analysis and Results
This research tests three network designs: baseline structure, simple allocation
structure, and the long chain structure. PACAF was strategically chosen as the test case to
apply this simulation because of the rising capabilities of US adversaries and
vulnerabilities of the network to natural disaster. The simple allocation and the long chain
structure reiterates the need for simultaneous investment in inventory and production
capacity, while also illustrating the realized benefits and cost differences in various levels
of flexibility incorporation. All scenarios used to test the various network designs are
evaluated during their transient states. Numerous disruption response times are
implemented that “turn on” predetermined amounts of recovery capacity for the specific
scenario. Hence, this research shows the importance of predetermined asset allocations
on a location’s ability to respond to a disruption. An important distinction will be made
regarding the costs of these production capacity assets in the resilience cost section.
Associated with the established time periods outlined in section 3.5 are three
performance metrics: The Pre-Disruption MC Rate, the Minimum Performance Level
(MPL), and the Recovery Performance Level (RPL). Fully understanding the
performance of a network in the event of a disruption requires a deep understanding of
the interconnectedness of the mentioned performance metrics. They are defined as
follows:

Pre-Disruption MC Rate: The average daily MC Rate from day 1200 to day 1400.
Minimum Performance Level (MPL): The network’s minimum level of performance
resulting from a disruption.
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Recovery Performance Level (RPL): The average daily performance after network
performance has recovered.

The following sections illustrate the importance of these metrics on network
performance. The emphasis is on the ability to maintain performance after the disruption
has occurred. In doing so, the ability to meet a specified level of demand during a
disruption begins where the Pre-Disruption MC Rate ends. In other words, a network’s
starting performance is extremely important for cumulative system performance
throughout all stages of a disruption.
4.1 Baseline Structure
The baseline structure represents PACAF as it currently operates. It provides valuable
insight as to how the network resists and recovers from a disruption due to its inherent
flexibility and current capabilities. Table 7 shows the output generated from the
developed scenarios outlined in Table 6. Each scenario represents a predetermined level
of initial capacity and recovery capacity. The scenario with 1.00 of initial and recovery
capacity represents PACAF’s performance without any additional investment in
resilience. No additional investment in production capacity leads to grave consequences.
For instance, all bases have an equal probability of experiencing a disruption. If Misawa
experiences the disruption, the CRF and all other repair capabilities are lost, further
exacerbating the consequences on PACAF cumulative performance.
4.1.1 Impacts on Transient Performance Metrics
The baseline structure does not simultaneously increase the investment in spare
inventory as the amount of capacity increases. However, Table 7 emphasizes the
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importance in a network’s ability to maximize its Pre-Disruption MC Rate in the event of
a disruption. The transient performance of the network starts with the Pre-Disruption MC
Rate, and the higher the starting point for the decline to occur, the greater the AUC Decline will be. Shown in Table 7, as the investment in initial capacity increases, so too
does the Pre-Disruption MC Rate, yielding a higher AUC – Decline and MPL.
Subsequently, a higher MPL leads to the ability to meet a greater level of demand during
the Post Disruption – Recovery period as illustrated by the increase in AUC – Recovery
and ultimately a higher RPL. Similarly, Figure 7 illustrates the impact of an expedited
response time and additional production capacity investment on the network’s AUC –
Total. However, an important phenomenon is illustrated in the baseline structure. Notice
that the RPL realizes marginal gains as the Pre-Disruption MC Rate increases. This
further reiterates the necessity of simultaneous investment in inventory and production
capacity. Although the network’s ability to perform in the face of disruption undoubtedly
increases with a greater level of investment, a sub-optimal output is realized when only
production capacity is increased. This point is further illustrated using the simple
allocation and long chain structure. Alternatively, the investment in recovery capacity has
the greatest benefit to RPL in the baseline structure.
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Table 7: Baseline 40-Day Response Output
S cenario

Pre Disruption Post-Disruption - Decline Post Disruption - Recovery

Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate
1.00

1.00

1.10

1.20

1.30

70.74

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

53.04

11,261

N/A

N/A

11,261

$ 126,246,142

1.10

70.74

58.06

2,560

58.84

9,481

12,041

$ 127,402,468

1.20

70.74

58.09

2,560

61.83

9,870

12,430

$ 128,405,856

1.30

70.74

58.09

2,560

65.85

10,463

13,023

$ 129,233,582

1.40

70.74

58.09

2,560

71.82

11,355

13,915

$ 130,546,799

1.50

70.74

58.09

2,560

74.75

11,815

14,374

$ 131,319,197

1.00

75.08

54.61

2,686

54.51

9,157

11,842

$ 127,402,468

1.10

75.08

57.10

2,686

55.56

9,437

12,123

$ 128,558,794

1.20

75.08

59.01

2,686

58.36

9,770

12,456

$ 129,562,182

1.30

75.08

59.88

2,686

63.34

10,391

13,077

$ 130,389,908

1.40

75.08

59.95

2,686

71.03

11,261

13,947

$ 131,703,125

1.50

75.08

59.95

2,686

74.33

11,739

14,425

$ 132,475,523

1.00

77.71

60.35

2,844

59.13

9,820

12,663

$ 129,992,628

1.10

77.71

62.54

2,844

60.27

10,099

12,943

$ 131,148,954

1.20

77.71

64.22

2,844

62.17

10,358

13,202

$ 132,152,342

1.30

77.71

64.61

2,844

66.90

11,012

13,855

$ 132,980,068

1.40

77.71

64.66

2,844

73.57

11,697

14,540

$ 134,293,285

1.50

77.71

64.69

2,844

77.03

12,167

15,011

$ 135,065,683

1.00

82.86

63.80

3,030

63.20

10,512

13,542

$ 130,820,354

1.10

82.86

65.90

3,030

64.52

10,973

14,003

$ 131,976,679

1.20

82.86

67.59

3,030

66.48

11,125

14,155

$ 132,980,068

1.30

82.86

69.46

3,030

67.84

11,388

14,419

$ 133,807,793

1.40

82.86

69.46

3,030

72.36

12,239

15,269

$ 135,121,011

1.50

82.86

69.46

3,030

75.42

12,389

15,419

$ 135,893,408

42

Figure 7: Baseline Response Comparison (10 vs. 40-Day)
4.1.2 Criticality of Response Time
An organization’s ability to quickly identify and respond to a disruption is essential to
its performance during and after a disruption. The disruption response time is varied after
a disruption occurs and assumes that the response time is tied directly to the ability to
“turn on” the predetermined asset allocations of recovery capacity at the remaining
locations. The response time is a function of an organization’s ability and willingness to
invest in predetermined asset allocations. Figure 8, Figure 9, and Table 8 illustrate the
consequences of a prolonged response time on cumulative network performance.
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Figure 8: Varying Response Time - Baseline Structure (1.00 Initial Cap, 1.40
Recovery Cap)

Figure 9: All Responses – Baseline Structure (1.00 Initial Cap, 1.40 Recovery Cap)
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Table 8: Baseline Performance with Prolonged Response Times
Scenario

Pre Disruption Post-Disruption - Decline Post Disruption - Recovery

Response Time Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate
10-Day
20-Day

1.00

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

1.40

70.74

67.82

705

71.45

13,779

14,484

$ 130,546,799

1.40

70.74

62.36

1,359

71.32

12,793

14,152

$ 130,546,799

30-Day

1.40

70.74

59.91

1,971

71.23

12,015

13,986

$ 130,546,799

40-Day

1.40

70.74

58.09

2,560

71.82

11,355

13,915

$ 130,546,799

Illustrated by the decline in Figure 8 and Figure 9, an expedited response time is greatly
beneficial to the network’s ability to meet demand during the disruption by yielding a
higher MPL and AUC - Total across all associated time periods. This research assumes
that regardless of the response time, the investment level across all response times is the
same. It is important to note that, realistically, this may not be the case. A higher cost
may be associated with an expedited response time. Additionally, the ability to expedite a
disruption response significantly limits the network’s downside risk. For instance, Figure
8 shows the average MC Rate (Black line), the 50th percentile (Green lines), and the
minimum and maximum MC Rates (Blue lines) across all replications. Moreover, Figure
9 shows the impact of a prolonged response time on MPL of the network. The dashed
lines point to the exact minimum reached on the y-axis resulting from the associated
response time. The minimum MC Rate is significantly higher with a 10-day response as
compared to a prolonged response time.
Response time is a critical driver to an organization’s ability to facilitate a recovery to
pre-disruption performance levels. If, for instance, decision makers lack the ability to
increase investment in inventory and production capacity, an expedited response time
provides the ability to mitigate downside risk and maintain performance in the event of a
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disruption. Therefore, an expedited response time is a viable alternative to hedge against
the inability to use resources that have been lost in the event of a disruption.
4.2 Simple Allocation Structure
The simple allocation structure realizes a significant increase in resilience investment
across all locations. The simple allocation structure allocates the network’s greatest
capacity quantity (Misawa) and assigns it as recovery capacity at all other locations.
Furthermore, the simple allocation structure incorporated an additional propulsion CRF at
Kunsan to illustrate the beneficial impacts of decentralization on network performance
while facing disruptions. Additionally, and in a similar manner to production capacity,
the simple allocation structure allocated Misawa’s spare inventory quantity across all
locations to illustrate the need for simultaneous inventory investment to realize the
greatest benefit from the increase in recovery capacity. Therefore, the simple allocation
structure demonstrated the highest level of resilience resulting from the large increase in
resilience investment. Table 9 highlights the performance and costs of the simple
allocation structure. Due to the large increase in resilience and subsequent performance,
an increased investment in initial and recovery capacity was not utilized. Hence, the
number of needed scenarios was drastically reduced.
Table 9: Simple Allocation Structure Output
Scenario

Pre Disruption Post-Disruption - Decline Post Disruption - Recovery

Response Time Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate
10-Day
20-Day

1.00

72.66

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

68.82

727

84.84

16,783

17,510

$ 177,264,060

1.00

72.66

61.00

1,453

85.42

15,263

16,716

$ 177,264,060

30-Day

1.00

72.66

55.39

2,180

85.57

14,418

16,598

$ 177,264,060

40-Day

1.00

72.66

53.91

2,858

86.17

13,632

16,490

$ 177,264,060

1.00
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4.2.1 Impacts on Transient Performance Metrics
Table 9 illustrates the impact of higher initial inventory quantities on the network’s
Pre-Disruption MC Rate. Spare inventory has a greater impact on the ability of the
system to resist the occurrence of a disruption (Melnyk et al., 2013). As shown, the PreDisruption MC Rate is greater in the simple allocation structure than in the baseline
structure at the same level of initial capacity investment. Thus, the simple allocation
structure leads to a higher MPL across all scenarios and response times at the same level
of initial capacity as compared to the baseline structure. Furthermore, due to the high
level of investment in recovery capacity, the corresponding RPL and AUC – Recovery all
meet significantly higher demand. Thus, recovery capacity has the greatest impact on a
network’s ability to recover from a disruption.
4.2.2 Criticality of Response Time
The ability of an organization to expedite its disruption response is further
emphasized using the simple allocation structure design. Regardless of the investment in
recovery capacity, decision makers must emphasize the need of a rapid response to
realize the full potential of the recovery capacity.
4.3 Long Chain Structure
The third design uses the long chain flexibility approach identified in the literature to
allocate production capacity across PACAF (Jordan & Graves, 1995). Note that the
baseline structure is inherently flexible. For instance, each location possesses I-level
repair capabilities for at least three PRGs. The exception is Misawa due to its ability to
perform the repair of propulsion I-level discrepancies. Therefore, the long chain approach
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eliminates a portion of the inherent flexibility of the network by allocating the ability to
perform the repair of only two PRGs at each location. In doing so, the original production
capacity allocation for each PRG is split and assigned to the two locations that possess
capabilities for that specific PRG in equal sums. The initial capacity quantity for the
network is equal to that of the baseline structure. Furthermore, only recovery capacity is
increased in the developed scenarios. Due to the large investment necessary in recovery
capacity to recover to pre-disruption performance levels, the developed long chain
scenarios were duplicated, once with no added spare inventory, and once with an
additional investment in spare inventory. The results are compared in Table 10 and Table
11, which also show the developed scenarios and response output for the 10-day response
time. Figure 10 shows the impact of additional resilience investment and an expedited
response time on the network’s AUC – Total.
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Table 10: Long Chain 10-Day Response Output Original Inventory Levels
S cenario

Pre-Disruption Post Disruption - Decline

Response Time Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate

10-Day

1.00

MPL

AUC-D

Post Disruption - Recovery
RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

1.00

68.19

46.92

10,412

N/A

N/A

10,412

$ 93,286,471

1.10

68.19

44.34

680

44.34

9,954

10,634

$ 94,465,440

1.20

68.19

48.58

680

48.58

10,354

11,034

$ 95,775,334

1.30

68.19

51.14

680

51.14

10,562

11,243

$ 97,337,275

1.40

68.19

53.71

680

53.71

10,921

11,602

$ 98,559,419

1.50

68.19

57.21

680

57.21

11,427

12,107

$ 99,938,087

1.60

68.19

58.44

680

58.44

11,588

12,269

$ 101,005,107

1.70

68.19

60.22

680

60.22

11,864

12,544

$ 102,227,250

1.80

68.19

63.04

680

63.04

12,174

12,854

$ 103,789,191

1.90

68.19

64.75

680

64.75

12,500

13,180

$ 105,099,086

2.00

68.19

65.19

680

65.19

12,667

13,347

$ 106,278,054

2.10

68.19

66.03

680

66.03

12,973

13,653

$ 107,457,023

Table 11: Long Chain 10-Day Response Output Increased Inventory Levels
S cenario

Pre-Disruption Post Disruption - Decline

Response Time Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate

10-Day

1.00

MPL

AUC-D

Post Disruption - Recovery
RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

1.00

71.14

51.37

11,121

N/A

N/A

11,121

$ 96,038,078

1.10

71.14

52.51

711

52.68

10,602

11,313

$ 97,217,046

1.20

71.14

55.69

711

55.33

11,151

11,863

$ 98,526,941

1.30

71.14

57.04

711

57.07

11,465

12,176

$ 100,088,882

1.40

71.14

58.10

711

58.90

11,640

12,351

$ 101,311,025

1.50

71.14

60.11

711

60.99

11,996

12,707

$ 102,689,694

1.60

71.14

61.61

711

62.52

12,199

12,910

$ 103,756,713

1.70

71.14

62.73

711

63.85

12,410

13,121

$ 104,978,857

1.80

71.14

64.68

711

65.36

12,684

13,396

$ 106,540,798

1.90

71.14

66.88

711

67.67

13,069

13,780

$ 107,850,692

2.00

71.14

68.48

711

68.81

13,327

14,039

$ 109,029,661

2.10

71.14

68.61

711

69.90

13,476

14,188

$ 110,208,629
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Figure 10: Long Chain Response Comparison (10 vs. 40-Day)
4.3.1 Impacts on Transient Performance Metrics
Perhaps there is no better example of the need for simultaneous investment than the
developed long chain scenarios. Although the realized benefits of increased investment
on disruption performance is consistent with the previous designs, the impacts of
increased inventory on the network’s ability to maintain a higher level of demand are
undeniable. Mentioned throughout this research is the need to invest in inventory and
production capacity in unison. To invest in one without the other will lead to a suboptimal output (Femano et al., 2019). Table 11 greatly reiterates this point. Within all
stages of the disruption, the scenarios with an increased investment in inventory
outperformed the scenarios that did not simultaneously increase the investment. For
instance, higher quantities of inventory facilitated a higher Pre-Disruption MC Rate,
which led to a higher MPL across all scenarios. Furthermore, and contrary to the baseline
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scenarios which experienced a higher starting point due to the increased investment in
initial capacity, the greater starting point facilitated a greater RPL for the scenarios with
increased inventory. Once again, this is due to the need for an increase in inventory to
realize the greatest potential from the increase in production capacity.
4.3.2 Criticality of Response Time
Due to the inherent structure of the long chain design, the total production capacity
for one PRG is halved and allocated to each assigned location. When a disruption occurs,
the network loses a greater portion of the allocated production capacity as compared to
the baseline or simple structure. Hence, the impact of a disruption without an appropriate
predetermined asset allocation is further exacerbated. As shown in the following section,
the benefits from employing the long chain approach comes from the ability to invest in a
greater amount of capacity to respond to a disruption at a much lesser cost. This
production capacity allocation inherently places a greater need to respond after a
disruption has occurred. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the beneficial impacts of an
expedited recovery using the long chain approach. Similar to Figure 8, Figure 11
provides the average MC Rate (Black line), the 50th percentile (Green lines), and the
minimum and maximum MC Rates (Blue lines) across all replications.

51

Figure 11: Varying Response Time – Long Chain Structure (1.00 Initial Cap, 2.10
Recovery Cap)

Figure 12: All Responses – Long Chain Structure (1.00 Initial Cap, 2.10 Recovery
Cap)
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Table 12: Long Chain Performance with Prolonged Response Times
Scenario

Pre Disruption Post-Disruption - Decline Post Disruption - Recovery

Response Time Initial Cap Recovery Cap Avg MC Rate

MPL

AUC-D

RPL

AUC-R

AUC-Total

Total $$

10-Day

2.10

71.14

68.61

711

69.90

13,476

14,188

$ 110,208,629

20-Day

2.10

71.14

63.93

1,385

70.18

12,524

13,909

$ 110,208,629

1.00

30-Day

2.10

71.14

59.40

2,004

69.93

11,730

13,734

$ 110,208,629

40-Day

2.10

71.14

57.73

2,587

70.06

10,989

13,576

$ 110,208,629

As outlined in the literature, if an organization’s ability to respond to a disruption is
obstructed, the use of increased inventory creates a resistance to the disruption by
enabling the organization to maintain a higher level of performance after the disruption
occurs (Melnyk et al., 2013; Femano et al., 2019). Table 11 shows that the greater
quantity of inventory provides a greater AUC – Decline and AUC – Recovery. Therefore,
if an expedited response time is not feasible, greater levels of inventory provide the
ability to hedge against downside risk by providing resistance to the disruption.
4.4 Resilience Costs
The PACAF theater is used to demonstrate the applicability of the developed tool, but
this research provides a generalizable simulation tool that may be applied across multiple
domains. The assigned costs are specific to that of PACAF, but the structure of this tool
allows ease of translatability across numerous theaters, airframes, and industry related
repair networks.
From a cost feasibility standpoint, this research recognizes that the simple allocation
structure is not likely to be implemented. It is included to further emphasize the
importance of decentralization and simultaneous investment. The long chain structure
inherently subtracts from the flexibility of the baseline and simple allocation structure.
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However, the cumulative performance of the overall network is extremely comparable to
that of the baseline structure at a substantially reduced cost. When implementing the long
chain design, the massive cost savings are realized from the decrease in the large capital
expenditures necessary to house the repair capabilities of four PRGs at one location.
Figure 13 illustrates the usefulness of the resilience metric when comparing
performance across multiple structures and response times. Specifically, Figure 13
provides insight into the level of resilience investment needed to reach Pre-Disruption
MC Rates (1.00) after a disruption occurs using the baseline and long chain structures.
More importantly, Figure 13 highlights the overlapping performance and stark cost
difference between the baseline and long chain structures.
The resilience metric provides a direct indication of how an organization performs in
the event of a disruption. When a disruption strikes, demand does not cease to exist.
Therefore, regardless of the organization, some level of demand will need to be met when
a disruption occurs. The resilience metric allows decision makers and organizations to
predict the level of demand that can be met resulting from predetermined investments in
resilience.
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Figure 13: Structure Performance/Cost Comparison
4.5 Validity of an Expedited Response Time
Figure 13 combines the scatter output from the baseline and long chain structures for
performance and cost comparison. As the investment in resilience increases using the
long chain structure, the resulting AUC – Total increases linearly. Additionally, the
difference between the 10- and 40-day response time is clear. However, as the resilience
investment is increased using the baseline structure, the results are not as distinct between
the 10- and 40-day response. To validate that there is in fact a difference between an
expedited and a prolonged response time in AUC - Total, this research employed the
Paired T-Test to statistically test the difference between varying responses. A Paired T
Test was chosen to test the difference between the two dependent samples (Milton &
Arnold, 2003). Specifically, this test allows the researcher to evaluate the following:
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𝐻𝐻0 : 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 = 𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦
𝐻𝐻1 : 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 > 𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦

(3)

which determines whether there is a statistical difference between the response time
means. To conduct the statistical test, a test statistic was developed from the following
equation (Milton & Arnold, 2003):

where,

𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =

𝑢𝑢𝐷𝐷 − 0
𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 /√𝑛𝑛

(4)

uD is the mean of the differences between two response times,
0 is the hypothesized difference between two response times,
SD is the standard deviation of the difference in means between two response times,
n is the sample size.

Since multiple response times are being analyzed, the chance of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is true (type 1 error), drastically increases (Statistics Solutions, 2019).
Hence, the Bonferroni correction was implemented to lower the significance level by
dividing 0.05 by 4 (the number of response time comparisons) (Statistics Solutions,
2019). This maintains a cumulative 95% confidence level that regardless of the
comparison, an expedited response is more beneficial than a prolonged response. Using n
and the developed T Stat, a p-value is determined and compared to the new alpha of
0.0125. Table 13 and Table 14 illustrate the p-values associated with the developed T Stat
for each structure and response time. The simple allocation structure was not included
because it did not meet the minimum required investment scenarios.
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Table 13: Baseline Structure Response P-Values

Response
10
20
30
40

Baseline Structure
10
20
30
0.00056
0.00003
0.00346
0.00001
0.000002 0.00075

40
-

Table 14: Long Chain Structure Response P-Values

Response
10
20
30
40

Long Chain Structure
10
20
30
0.00078
0.00009
0.00074
0.00006
0.00018 0.00083

40
-

As illustrated by Table 13 and Table 14, the p-values for each response time comparison
prove extremely significant across all scenarios. As expected, as the time between two
comparisons increase, the p-value decreases, which further validates the benefits of an
expedited response. Hence, this research can reject the H0 and conclude that regardless of
the structure and response time comparison, an expedited response time yields a higher
AUC – Total than that of a prolonged response time.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The research provides a generalizable simulation tool to quantify the level of network
resilience resulting from predetermined asset allocations and various network designs in
the face of disruption. The PACAF theater is used to demonstrate the application of the
model. Additionally, the importance of bolstering network resilience by simultaneously
investing in multiple resilience levers is demonstrated. The research illustrates the grave
consequences of a lack of preparedness on performance following a disruption.
Moreover, this research demonstrates how a well-designed network can meet demand at a
reasonable cost.
5.1 Problem Statement Resolution
For both military and industry, the need to recognize and accept an inherently
uncertain future is essential for the going concern of any organization (de Neufville &
Scholtes, 2011). Decision makers must possess the ability to analyze and evaluate how an
organization’s identified resilience levers may be implemented in building lasting
organizational resilience. Specifically, decision makers must be able to forecast future
levels of resilience resulting from predetermined asset allocations and their associated
cost levels.
To answer Research Question 1, this research developed a discrete-event simulation
tool to properly identify and apply organizational resilience levers to build cumulative
resilience. The profound impacts on network performance are illustrated when inventory
and production capacity are increased in unison. The methodology proposed is
translatable across theaters, airframes, and multiple other domains. The three scenarios

58

illustrate the tradeoffs between resilience investment and network performance.
However, resilience levers are dependent upon the organization utilizing this tool. The
quantity and complexity of the chosen resilience levers must be tailored to fit the needs of
the specific organization or industry using this method.
Research Question 2 addresses the allocation of assets while facing disruption.
Specifically, in addition to the baseline structure, this research employs two additional
network designs to evaluate asset allocations on disruption mitigation. Strategically
chosen to illustrate the impacts of simultaneous investment, the simple allocation and
long chain structures greatly alter the amount of investment needed to achieve a desired
performance level. By varying the amount of capital expenditure necessary to support
repair operations and the amount of production capacity at each location, the simple
allocation and long chain structures illustrate the impacts of various levels of flexibility
on overall performance and cost of network resilience. The simple allocation and long
chain structures provide a worst- and best-case scenario in terms of cost feasibility of
reaching a desired performance level. More importantly, implementing multiple network
designs shows the ease of drastically shifting the structural integrity of the tool, further
illustrating its adaptable nature.
5.2 Findings
This research provides an approach to evaluate resilience investment decisions across
multiple domains. Metrically and monetarily quantifying specific levels of predetermined
asset allocations on cumulative network performance allows an organization to more
effectively allocate organizational resources to achieve a desired level of performance.
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Additionally, the proposed AUC metric provides a generalizable method to gauge various
levels of network resilience during the network’s transient states of a disruption.
This research facilitates a deep understanding of the identified resilience levers and
their associated impacts on the transient performance of a network. Understanding the
key phases following a disruption is essential to optimizing the investment in resilience
levers to mitigate the impact on performance.
When faced with an imminent disruption, the greatest mitigating impacts result from
the simultaneous investment in spare inventory and production capacity. The
combination of initial capacity and inventory is essential to an organization’s ability to
withstand the impact of a disruption, while the ability to respond with predetermined
asset allocations is essential to the ability to recover. The level of network performance
recovery is a direct result of the response time and pre-disruption performance.
Therefore, the criticality of an organization’s pre-disruption performance level must be
emphasized. Additionally, the ability to optimize the recovery of a network is a function
of the inventory-capacity investment prior to the disruption occurring, as shown using the
long chain structure. Hence, this tool provides a means of striking the delicate balance
between inventory and capacity by quantifying the impact on performance resulting from
a specified investment level.
Additionally, when implementing capacity expansion, the long chain flexibility
approach provides the most cost-effective means to do so. The ability to limit the capital
expenditure associated with expansion is the greatest realized benefit of implementing the
long chain approach. The inherent freeing of capital provides a more cost-effective means
of facilitating resilience by allowing an increased investment in resilience levers,
60

specifically in inventory and recovery capacity to hedge against the impacts of a
disruption.
5.3 Future Research Opportunities
The study of disruption impacts on network performance is not recommended without
a deep knowledge and understanding of an organization’s network and capabilities. This
tool aids in developing an understanding of the intricacies and interconnectedness of a
USAF repair network. An opportunity for future research exists for implementing a more
realistic disruption impact. For instance, within the developed scenarios, once a
disruption occurs, the impacted location instantly loses all repair capabilities. This may
not be the case. A deep-dive analysis into the impacts of a disruption on the applied
network would prove beneficial in implementing a more general approach to disruption
evaluation and ultimately, the shifting of salvageable resources from the impacted
location.
The chosen repair network and airframe represents a small, yet extremely important
part of cumulative USAF performance. This model was specifically built with the
necessary foundations needed for airframe expansion. Multiple airframes and theaters
could be applied within this tool to accurately measure and quantify resilience and
associated investment from a wider Air Force perspective.
Furthermore, an extensive review of the many organizational resilience levers is
necessary to determine the level of investment needed to maximize their performance. A
thorough cost-analysis is necessary for organizations to maximize the impact of
investment dollars across all identified resilience levers. Additionally, necessary socio-
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technical layers could be implemented that considers the behaviors of decision makers
when experiencing a disruptive event (de Neufville & Scholtes, 2011). Ultimately, this
would provide a more accurate representation of network performance when faced with
budgetary and capacity constraints.
5.4 Limitations
The use of product repair groups and their associated LRUs further facilitated a deep
understanding of the many intricacies of PACAF during disruption. Additionally,
location specific spare quantities and their associated costs were necessary to generate the
most accurate cost representation of PACAF resilience. However, this research assumes
every identified discrepancy is a Level-3 break and that only one failure may occur on an
aircraft at a time. As breaks are generated and identified by flight line maintenance,
regardless of the break severity, the cumulative MC Rate is lowered. Realistically, more
failures may occur at once and lower severity breaks may not drop the aircraft out of
mission-capable status. For a more accurate performance and cost representation of the
applied network, logic could be inserted that allows the failure of multiple parts on one
aircraft simultaneously.
5.5 Conclusion
This research established a generalizable methodology and tool to quantify and assess
how incremental investment in resilience levers equates to additional resilience. This
research employed the USAF PACAF F-16 repair network as the illustrative example of
its usefulness, but this tool is extremely applicable across many platforms. This research
posits the use of the AUC metric to better understand an organization’s ability to meet
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demand during the transient states of a disruption. Additionally, the inherent tradeoff of
spare inventory and production capacity is illustrated by comparing the corresponding
AUCs and cost of each design scenario.
When evaluating network performance in the event of a disruption, decision makers
must possess a deep understanding of the disruption time periods and the inherent
interconnectedness of the associated time period metrics. The proactive use of
predetermined asset allocations is only as useful as an organization’s understanding of
their impacts on disruption time period metrics. In other words, the importance of the
simultaneous investment in inventory and production capacity is essential to maximizing
pre-disruption performance. As illustrated using the baseline structure, sub-optimal
performance will be realized with investment in isolation (Femano et al., 2019).
Furthermore, an organization’s disruption response time drives its ability to recover.
Regardless of the resilience investment level, a prolonged response time poses grave
consequences on an organization’s ability to meet pre- and post-disruption demand.
Although the illustrative example lies military centric, it is strategically chosen for its
similarities and applicability across multiple domains. Paired with the use of the
developed time period metrics and AUC, this tool provides decision makers a greater
ability to predict network performance following a disruption and therefore make more
informed resource allocation decisions.
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Appendix A: PACAF Baseline Simulation Design
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Appendix B: Output Consolidation Code (Femano et al., 2019)
agg_TS = [];
is_filename = 1;
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
for j =1:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruption
is_filename = 1;
for r = 1:reps
s = num2str(spares(i));
c = num2str(servers(j));
d = num2str(ddays(k));
try
filename = [Exp_name, '_',s,'Spares','_',c,'Cap','_','DDay',d,'_Rep',num2str(r),'.csv']
[T, SL] = AggregateStateData(filename,time_unit);
size(T)
agg_TS = [agg_TS;repmat(spares(i), numel(T),1), repmat(servers(j),
numel(T),1),repmat(ddays(k), numel(T),1), repmat(r, numel(T),1), T,SL];
catch
warning('No such scenario. Going to next scenario');
is_filename = 0;
r = reps;
end
end
end
end
end
save(['agg_TS_' Exp_name], 'agg_TS');
parameters = [spares, servers, ddays reps, time_unit];
save(['parameters_',Exp_name], 'parameters' );
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Appendix C: Area Under the Curve Code (Femano et al., 2019)
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(1) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==1, :);
T = TS(:,5);
maxT = T(end);
time_unit = T(2)-T(1);
endT = (maxT-5*time_unit)/time_unit;
figure;
z =1;
key_measures = [];
%Fit Baseline disruption case first
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(1))
d = num2str(ddays(1))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
end
km = analyze_ts(T(:,1),mean(SL,2), T_dis, T_rec,0,1,0)
%area under disruption
fun_pre = @(x,Tpre)x(1)+Tpre*0;
fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(3)-x(4))*exp(-((Tdis - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2))+x(4);
A_pre = km(1);
x_dis = km(2:end-1);
A_All_Min = km(end);
au_dis = integral(@(T)fun_dis(x_dis,T), T_dis, T_end);
au_rec = 0;
key_measures = [key_measures;spares(i),0,T_dis, T_rec, km(1:end-1), au_dis,
au_rec, au_dis+au_rec, A_All_Min];

plot(T, fun_pre(A_pre, T), 'LineWidth', 2)
hold on
plot(T, fun_dis(x_dis,T), 'LineWidth', 2)
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plot (T(:,1),mean(SL,2), 'LineWidth', .5)
axis([0 2000 0 100]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']);
xlabel('Day');
ylabel('Available Aircraft');
end
figure;
A_dis = mean(key_measures(:,9));
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
z=1;
for j =2:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruption
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(j))
d = num2str(ddays(k))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(k)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
end
T = T(:,1);
km = analyze_ts(T,mean(SL,2), T_dis, T_rec, A_dis, 1,1);
fun_pre = @(x,Tpre)x(1)+Tpre*0;
fun_dis = @(x,Tdis)(x(3)-x(4))*exp(-((Tdis - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2))+x(4);
fun_rec = @(x,Trec)(x(3)-x(4))*(1-exp(-((Trec - x(5))./x(1)).^x(2)))+x(4);
A_pre = km(1);
x_dis = km(2:6);
x_rec = km(7:end-1);
A_All_Min = km(end);
au_dis = integral(@(T)fun_dis(x_dis,T), T_dis, T_rec);
au_rec = integral(@(T)fun_rec(x_rec,T), T_rec, T_end);
key_measures = [key_measures;spares(i),servers(j),T_dis, T_rec, km(1:end-1),
au_dis, au_rec, au_dis+au_rec, A_All_Min];
subplot(1, numel(servers)-1, z);
Tpre = T(T<=T_dis);
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SLpre = SL(T<=T_dis);
Tdis = T(T>=T_dis&T<=T_rec);
SLdis = SL(T>=T_dis&T<=T_rec);
Trec = T(T>=T_rec);
SLrec = SL(T>=T_rec);
plot(Tpre, fun_pre(A_pre, Tpre), 'LineWidth', 2)
hold on
plot(Tdis, fun_dis(x_dis,Tdis), 'LineWidth', 2)
plot(Trec, fun_rec(x_rec,Trec), 'LineWidth', 2)
plot (T(:,1),mean(SL,2), 'LineWidth', .5)
axis([0 2000 30 100]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']); xlabel('Day'); ylabel('Available Aircraft');
%z= z+1
end
z= z+1;
end
end
key_measures = real(key_measures);
save(['key_measures_', Exp_name],'key_measures');
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Appendix D: Plot Time Series Code (Femano et al., 2019)
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(1) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(1)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(1)&agg_TS(:,4)==1, :);
T = TS(:,5);
maxT = T(end);
time_unit = T(2)-T(1);
endT = (maxT-5*time_unit)/time_unit;
for i=1:numel(spares) %spares
for j =1:numel(servers) %added servers
for k = 1:numel(ddays) %date of disruption
s = num2str(spares(i))
c = num2str(servers(j))
d = num2str(ddays(k))
[Exp_name,' ',s,' Spares',' ',c,' Servers',' ','Dday on ',d]
try
T=[];
SL = [];
for r = 1:reps
TS = agg_TS(agg_TS(:,1)==spares(i) &
agg_TS(:,2)==servers(j)&agg_TS(:,3)==ddays(k)&agg_TS(:,4)==r, :);
T = [T,TS(1:endT,5)];
SL = [SL, TS(1:endT,6)];
End
subplot(numel(spares), numel(servers), z);
hold on;
plot(T(:,1), prctile(SL,25, 2), '-g', 'LineWidth', .5);
plot(T(:,1), prctile(SL,75, 2), '-g', 'LineWidth', .5);
plot(T(:,1), mean(SL,2),'-k', 'LineWidth', 1.25);
axis([1200 2000 10 100]);
title([s,' Spares',', ',c,' Servers']);
xlabel('Day');
ylabel('Available Aircraft');
z= z+1;
catch
warning('No such scenario. Going to next scenario');
end
end
end
end
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